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Abstract 
We examine whether reasoning is improved by evaluative 
feedback, i.e., the information of whether a reasoner’s answer 
was correct or incorrect, and report two studies that show that 
evaluative feedback increases the chances that participants 
will produce normatively correct responses for deductive 
reasoning problems. In Experiment 1, participants who were 
given feedback about their performance did better on 
problems based on disjunctions that were designed to elicit 
illusory inferences. In Experiment 2, participants answered 
difficult syllogisms with more accuracy when they were 
provided with feedback. We conclude by contrasting the rule-
, heuristics-, and model-based accounts of deduction on their 
ability to explain the effects of evaluative feedback. 
 
Keywords: feedback, reasoning, illusory inferences, 
syllogisms 
Introduction 
People often receive feedback after they have drawn an 
inference. Feedback can manifest in a contrarian’s 
objection, a pat on the back, a heated argument, or a grunt of 
disapproval. In many cases, feedback can be prescriptive, 
i.e., it can be accompanied by further instructions and 
suggestions for improvement, such as what one might 
receive in a classroom environment. In other cases, 
feedback can be evaluative and devoid of any pedagogical 
value, such as a final grade in a course. Prescriptive 
feedback has been shown to improve participants’ reasoning 
on a wide variety of tasks (Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & 
Oliver, 1986; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Leevers & 
Harriss, 1999). The effect is robust but unsurprising: if 
prescriptive feedback could not make better reasoners out of 
humans, it would be difficult to explain the internalization 
of rules, heuristics, and insights. Our investigation focuses 
instead on evaluative feedback, i.e., feedback that neither 
explains nor characterizes performance as any more than a 
minimal description of whether performance was correct or 
incorrect on a particular trial (Neth, Khemlani, & Gray, 
2008). We are interested in this impoverished form of 
feedback because it is unclear what effect, if any, it should 
have on a person’s future performance on similar problems 
(Klayman & Ha, 1987; Wason, 1960).  
Suppose reasoners were told that the deduction they drew 
from a set of premises was incorrect. Since they have no 
further information on why their answers were incorrect, it 
is not clear that the feedback could apply to different sets of 
premises. Reasoners may remember the structure of the 
premises so that if they encounter the same problem again, 
they can provide a correct answer, but there is little reason 
to think that the feedback should produce any systematic 
improvement in reasoning beyond correcting an answer to a 
particular problem unless reasoners directly search for an 
explanation of why they went wrong (Walsh & Johnson-
Laird, 2009). Moreover, given multiple-choice problems in 
which the elimination of one answer does not identify the 
correct answer, evaluative feedback might produce no effect 
whatsoever. Since memories are susceptible to interference 
and decay, it is uncertain whether evaluative feedback will 
have any impact on the ability to solve related but 
syntactically different problems. Few studies have examined 
how immediate evaluative feedback informs reasoning (but 
cf. Wason, 1964), and few psychological theories of 
reasoning explicitly permit evaluative feedback to modulate 
the way individuals reason (Braine & O’Brien, 1998; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Rips, 1994; Stenning & Van 
Lambalgen, 2008) though there is evidence that the first 
thing individuals do upon learning that their conclusion is 
incorrect is to check their reasoning (Johnson-Laird, Girotto, 
& Legrenzi, 2004).  
If feedback influences the way people make deductions, 
theories of reasoning ought to accommodate such effects by 
showing how individuals make use of the additional 
information with which they are supplied. In the following 
experiments, we show that immediate, evaluative feedback 
improves the way individuals reason. We conclude by 
explaining how three prominent theories of reasoning might 
account for improvements in performance due to evaluative 
feedback. 
Experiment 1: Sentential reasoning 
Experiment 1 presented participants with a set of 
problems that were expected to yield “illusory” sentential 
inferences. Sentential inferences are those based on 
sentential connectives such as and (a conjunction) and or (a 
disjunction). Illusory inferences are systematic errors that 
are produced when people fail to consider all of the 
possibilities consistent with the premises (Khemlani & 
Johnson-Laird, 2009). Each problem was based on a set of 
premises in which one disjunction was embedded within 
another. The disjunctions were either exclusive or inclusive; 
for example, consider these premises based on two 
exclusive disjunctions: 
 
Suppose one of the following assertions is true and one is false: 
1. You have the blue candies and the red candies. 
2. You have the red candies or else the orange candies, but not 
both. 
Is it possible to have the blue candies and the orange candies only?
Table 1: The four types of problem in Experiment 1, their premises and corresponding questions, the predicted conclusions, 
and the correct conclusions to each question. 
 
 Problem   Conclusion 
Type Premises Question  Predicted Correct 
Exclusive-exclusive One is true and one is false: 1. A and B. 2. B or else C 
Is it possible to have 
A and B only? 
 
Yes No 
Exclusive-inclusive One is true and one is false: 1. A and B. 2. B or C or both. 
Is it possible to have 
A and B? 
 
Yes No 
Inclusive-exclusive One or both are true: 1. A and B. 2. B or else C. 
Is it possible to have 
A and C only? 
 
No Yes 
Inclusive-inclusive One or both are true: 1. A and B. 2. B or C or both. 
Is it possible to have 
A and C only? 
 
No Yes 
 
The rubric makes clear that there is an exclusive disjunction 
between assertions 1 and 2. In previous studies participants 
tended to respond “no”, that it was not possible to have only 
the blue and orange candies (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 
2009, Experiments 2 and 3). The answer is illusory, 
however; the premises allow for the possibility of having 
only blue and orange candies. The difficulty of problems 
that yield illusory inferences is robust; even when 
participants received remedial instructions that explained 
how to overcome the illusions, they made errors more often 
than not. 
In the present study, participants were provided feedback 
about their responses. They were randomly assigned to two 
different feedback conditions: feedback, in which 
participants were informed about whether their answers 
were correct or incorrect; and no feedback, in which they 
received no information about their performance but rather 
continued to the next problem after a brief delay. 
Method 
Participants and design. 53 volunteers were recruited 
through a platform hosted by Amazon.com through which 
people participate in experiments over the Internet for 
monetary compensation (for a discussion on the validity of 
results from this platform, see Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ipeirotis, 2010). None of the participants had received any 
training in logic. They received four sorts of problems based 
on disjunctive premises, and all of the problems were 
designed to elicit an illusory inference. Table 1 presents the 
four sorts of problems, each of which was presented twice 
using different materials. We tested two groups of 
participants; one group received feedback on their answers 
and the other did not. 
 
Procedure and materials. On each trial, participants 
received a disjunctive set of premises and a question that 
was intended to elicit a fallacious response. Participants 
then selected buttons marked “Yes” or “No”. Once the 
participant responded, there was a delay for 2 seconds 
during which feedback, if appropriate, was displayed on the 
screen. In the no feedback condition, participants received 
just a delay before moving on to the next problem. 
Whenever feedback was given to a participant, it replaced 
the text of the premises and conclusion so that participants 
did not have access to the problem itself, and could not re-
evaluate the premises. The materials used in the study 
pertained to various combinations of colored candy, and 
participants received each set of materials only once. 
Results and discussion 
Table 2 presents the percentages of correct responses for 
each group of participants. Participants found the problems 
quite difficult, and produced correct responses 30% of the 
time. They made more correct responses when presented 
feedback than when not (Mann-Whitney test: 38% vs 21%, 
z = 3.00, p < .0001).  
 
Table 2: The percentage of correct responses to the four 
types of problem in Experiment 1 as a function of the type 
of feedback received. 
 
 Received feedback? 
Problem Type Yes No 
Exclusive-exclusive 28 12 
Exclusive-inclusive 28 8 
Inclusive-exclusive 55 27 
Inclusive-inclusive 41 35 
 
Participants in Experiment 1 performed better when 
presented evaluative feedback about the correctness or 
incorrectness of their answers on problems designed to yield 
illusory inferences. Likewise, performance did not differ as 
a function of the order in which the problems were 
presented; participants in the feedback condition did not do 
better on the last three trials compared to the first three trials 
in the experiment (33% vs. 37%, Wilcoxon test, z = .68, p = 
.49). 
Table 3: The premises of the fourteen types of syllogistic problems used in Experiment 2 and a set of candidate conclusions, 
which include: a correct conclusion that necessarily follows from the first and second premises; a consistent conclusion that 
does not necessarily follow from the premises; and the most common erroneous conclusion that reasoners generate. 
 
Problem  Candidate conclusion 
First premise Second premise  Correct Consistent Common conclusion 
Some A are B No C are B  Some A are not C Some C are not A No A are C 
All A are B Some C are not B  Some C are not A Some A are not C Some C are A 
No A are B Some B are C  Some C are not A Some A are not C No A are C 
All B are A No B are C  Some A are not C Some C are not A No A are C 
Some A are not B All C are B  Some A are not C Some C are not A Some A are C 
No B are A Some B are C  Some C are not A Some A are not C No A are C 
No B are A All B are C  Some C are not A Some A are not C No A are C 
All B are A Some B are not C  Some A are not C Some C are not A Some A are C 
Some B are A No B are C  Some A are not C Some C are not A No A are C 
All B are A All B are C  Some A are C All C are A All A are C 
No A are B Some C are B  Some C are not A Some A are not C No A are C 
No A are B All B are C  Some C are not A Some A are not C No A are C 
Some B are not A All B are C  Some C are not A Some A are not C Some A are C 
Some A are B No B are C  Some A are not C Some C are not A Some A are C 
 
One alternative explanation of the results in Experiment 1 is 
that instead of making participants better, feedback might 
have slowed them down so they could read the premises 
more carefully. A portion of the participants might have 
initially sped through the study, and if the effect of feedback 
was to get them to pay attention and stop responding 
erratically, then the results could be explained without 
recourse to theoretical claims about performance increases. 
We are skeptical of such an explanation for two reasons. 
First, most participants did not respond randomly; they 
performed reliably worse than chance. Second, every 
participant received a 2-second delay between trials, and so 
at the outset they were unable to rush through the study. 
Another explanation of the results in Experiment 1 is that 
instead of making participants perform better, feedback 
made participants more erratic. The percentage of correct 
responses was not reliably greater than what would be 
expected if participants chose responses at random, which 
could have been driven by a reduction in participants’ 
confidence in their initial answers due to the feedback they 
received. Likewise, one limitation of the present study is 
that erroneous disjunctive inferences, while representative 
of sentential reasoning, come about as a result of a tendency 
to overlook possibilities (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009, 
p. 622). To overcome these limitations, we used a different 
task and a more diverse set of materials in Experiment 2. 
Instead of having participants choose between just two 
alternatives, we provided participants several putative 
conclusions for syllogistic reasoning problems, only one of 
which validly followed from the premises. 
Experiment 2: Syllogistic reasoning 
Experiment 2 examined whether feedback could help 
participants discover the correct response to a syllogism 
from a set of alternatives. Syllogistic reasoning is logically 
simple but psychologically complex, and many theories 
have been proposed to deal with how humans process 
syllogisms. Modern theories of syllogistic reasoning are 
based on mental models (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Polk 
& Newell, 1995), formal rules of inference (Braine & 
O’Brien, 1998; Rips, 1994), or the mood of the most 
informative premise (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). 
Not all syllogisms are created equal; some are easy and 
can be solved in a matter of seconds, and others are so 
vexing that reasoners may spend many minutes considering 
their premises. Consider one such problem: 
 
All of the brewers are accountants 
All of the brewers are cashiers 
What must be true? 
 
Reasoners often conclude that all accountants are cashiers, 
or else that no valid conclusion follows from the premises. 
The former conclusion is false because not all accountants 
are necessarily brewers. The latter is false as well, because a 
valid conclusion exists: it follows that some accountants are 
cashiers. The moral of the story is that syllogisms are not 
always easy to solve, and in the present study, we chose 
those syllogisms that pose the most trouble for reasoners 
(see Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, in press, for a review). 
Participants were once again randomly assigned to the 
two feedback conditions that were used in Experiment 1, 
i.e., they either received feedback or did not. 
Method 
Participants and design. 56 volunteers were recruited from 
the same participant pool that was used in Experiment 1. All 
of the participants were untrained in logic, and they 
completed the experiment using an interface written in Ajax. 
They received fourteen syllogistic reasoning problems; 
Table 3 presents the premises of the problems and their 
corresponding alternative conclusions. As in the previous 
study, we tested a group of participants who received 
feedback against a control group that received no feedback.  
 
Procedure and materials. Participants took the study over 
the Internet, and for each problem they received two 
quantified premises and four alternative conclusions. The 
problems were taken from syllogisms identified by previous 
research as being the most difficult for reasoners 
(Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999; Chapman & Chapman, 
1959; Oaksford & Chater, 1999). One of the four alternative 
conclusions was correct, and the other three were 
distractors. The distractors consisted of a) a conclusion that 
is consistent with, but does not follow necessarily from, the 
premises; b) the most common but incorrect response that 
participants had spontaneously generated in previous studies 
(see Buciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 1999); and c) a “null” 
response, i.e., “no valid conclusion”. The order in which the 
alternative conclusions were displayed on the screen was 
randomized. 
Participants were told that only one of the four responses 
was correct. They registered their response by selecting 
buttons assigned to one of the four conclusions. When the 
participant responded, there was a delay for 2 seconds 
during which feedback, if appropriate, was displayed on the 
screen. Whenever feedback was given to a participant, it 
replaced the text of the premises. The materials used in the 
study pertained to various combinations of occupations, 
e.g., “All of the brewers are accountants,” and participants 
received each set of materials only once. 
Results and discussion 
Table 4 presents the proportion of agreement to the four 
different types of conclusions that were presented on each 
trial. The problems were difficult; across the study, 
participants agreed to correct conclusions 39% of the time. 
The feedback (44%) condition yielded reliably more correct 
responses than the no feedback condition (44% vs. 33%, 
Mann-Whitney test, z = 2.15, p < . 05), and this pattern held 
for 10 of the 12 syllogisms (Binomial test, p < .05). As in 
Experiment 1, performance in the feedback condition did 
not increase steadily; accuracy on the first five trials was not 
reliably lower than on the last five trials (41% vs. 45%, 
Wilcoxon test, z = .48, p = .63). 
 
Table 4: The proportion of agreement to the four types of 
conclusions in Experiment 2 as a function of the type of 
feedback received. 
 
 Received feedback? 
Conclusion type Yes No 
Correct 44 33 
Consistent 21 20 
Common 26 26 
No valid conclusion 9 16 
As in Experiment 1, we consider the alternative 
explanation that instead of making participants perform 
better, feedback slowed participants down and forced them 
to read the premises more carefully. The present results are 
not consistent with this account, because regardless of 
presence or absence of feedback participants chose the 
consistent conclusion about 20% of the time. If the feedback 
motivated them to be more careful, then they would have 
made fewer errors of interpretation, and we would see a 
difference between the extent to which they agreed with 
consistent answers. The uniformity of their answers 
suggests that in fact, participants were reading and 
comprehending the problems at the same level of 
competence regardless of the feedback they were given. 
General Discussion 
Across two different paradigms calling for deductive 
reasoning, evaluative feedback improved performance 
relative to no feedback. No psychological theory of 
deduction is constructed to explicitly make predictions 
about effects of feedback. However, we conclude by 
examining how the principles of various theories of 
reasoning might be used to account for the performance 
gains observed in our studies. 
Psychological theories of deduction fall into three broad 
categories: those based on formal rules akin to those in the 
proof theory of logic (e.g., Rips, 1994; Stenning & Van 
Lambalgen, 2008), those based on the processing of 
subjective probabilities and probabilistic heuristics 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007), and those based on models akin 
to those in the semantic theory of logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 
1983; Polk & Newell, 1995). Each type of theory yields a 
different account of how feedback might be integrated into 
deductive processes to improve reasoning performance. 
 
Theories of deduction based on formal rules 
Theories based on the application of formal rules of 
inference propose that reasoning is a process of proof in 
which syntactic rules are used to derive conclusions from 
the premises. A precursor to reasoning is accordingly the 
recovery of the logical form of premises to allow the 
application of rules. Once the logical form has been 
recovered, rules are applied over the formal structure of the 
premises to yield conclusions. Theories based on formal 
rules posit only those rules that allow participants to draw 
valid deductions, but recognize that humans often make 
errors in reasoning. For instance, Rips (1994, p. 386) 
suggests that logical errors are made more often for 
problems that require more steps of proof or that require 
complex rules to be applied to the premises. To solve a 
particular problem, syntactic rules must be utilized to derive 
a proof of its conclusion, step by step. Thus improvement in 
reasoning on a given problem can be explained by a) an 
increased tendency to recognize that a particular rule is 
necessary, and b) the increased frequency with which the 
rule is applied. Rips (1994) reports studies of such 
improvements. If evaluative feedback improves the way 
individuals reason, then it should affect the way particular 
rules are recognized and applied. Thus, rules theories 
predict that feedback makes it easier to recover the rules 
relevant to the problem at hand. But it is not clear how rules 
theories would account for generalized performance 
increases based on evaluative feedback, i.e., increases in 
reasoning that affect many rules at once. For complex 
reasoning problems that require several rules to be applied, 
a credit assignment problem exists: a reasoner does not 
know, based on evaluative feedback alone, which rule has 
been incorrectly applied. The reasoner’s performance can 
increase only if credit is assigned to the rule that was 
incorrectly applied; otherwise, it is possible that the 
reasoner does worse on future trials. Rules theories offer no 
hint at how the credit assignment problem could be 
overcome, but one solution is to statistically abstract the 
conditional relationship between the use of each particular 
rule in all relevant contexts and the ultimate outcome. Such 
a solution relies on gathering and encoding massive 
amounts of data, and so it is incompatible with performance 
increases after only a few trials. 
 
Heuristic based theories of deduction 
The theory of deduction based on probabilistic heuristics 
(Oaksford & Chater, 2007) assumes that individuals reason 
by employing simple heuristics based on informativeness 
and probabilistic entailment. A claim is informative if it 
rules out possibilities; thus, the universal statement All of 
the swans are white is more informative than the existential 
statement Some of the swans are white, because the 
universal rules out the possibility that some swans are not 
white, whereas the existential statement has no such 
constraint. Oaksford and Chater (2007) argue that people 
use heuristics based on this knowledge of informativeness to 
select and test conclusions along with heuristics based on 
probabilistic entailment, i.e., knowledge about whether one 
premise probabilistically follows from another. For instance, 
the statement All swans are white probabilistically entails 
the statement Some swans are white.  The authors detail 
several ways in which individuals might apply the heuristics 
based on informativity and probabilistic entailment to test 
and derive conclusions, and show that the predictions made 
by the heuristics are a good fit for the difficulty of certain 
syllogisms, i.e., arguments with two or more quantified 
premises (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, Ch. 7). 
Oaksford and Chater argue that for a particular syllogism, 
individuals construct and test conclusions based on 
heuristics that require the following pieces of information: 
1.) a complete ordering of premises on their 
informativeness; 2) the quantifier of the least informative 
premise; 3) a complete account of probabilistic entailments; 
4) the most informative premise. Oaksford and Chater 
suggest that (1) and (3) are immutable whereas (2) and (4) 
are calculated from the premises of each new problem. 
According to their theory, a human’s departure from a 
normative answer provided by logic need not be suboptimal, 
as logic is the wrong normative baseline by which to assess 
rationality. If humans “err”, they do so not because they do 
not provide the answer sanctioned by classical logic, but 
because they are equipped with inexpensive heuristics that 
are fallible. Chater and Oaksford’s (1999) analysis of 
difficult syllogisms suggest that to provide probabilistically 
valid responses to syllogistic reasoning problems, reasoners 
are required to apply apply all of the probabilistic heuristics 
specified in the model. As Copeland and Radvansky (2004) 
observe, the need to apply more heuristics taxes working 
memory as it requires individuals to hold in mind both the 
heuristics themselves as well as the results of each heuristic. 
Feedback may trigger improved performance by inducing 
reasoners to apply all heuristics instead of just a subset. 
 
Theories of reasoning based mental models 
The mental model theory of deduction (Johnson-Laird, 
1983) is based on the notion that individuals reason, both 
deductively and inductively, by constructing representations 
of possibilities. The theory proposes that the process of 
deduction goes through three stages: individuals first use the 
meaning of sentences and their knowledge to envisage what 
is possible given the propositions expressed in the premises, 
and they represent the possibilities as a single mental model. 
Second, the model is scanned for information not made 
explicit in the premises, and if any such information is 
found it is considered a putative conclusion. Third, 
individuals assess the conclusion by looking for 
counterexamples, i.e., alternative models of the premises 
where the conclusion is false. If a counterexample exists, 
then the conclusion is dismissed and individuals return to 
the second stage to construct an alternative explanation. 
Improved reasoning as a result of evaluative feedback can 
be attributed to the diligence with which individuals form 
models and search for counterexamples. Reasoners would 
then use feedback as a cue to fully flesh out multiple mental 
models and search for counterexamples. These processes 
require working memory resources to hold the relevant 
models in mind and operate on them. Thus, increases in 
executive control as a result of evaluative feedback may 
improve the ability to consider alternatives and search for 
counterexamples. 
 
In summary, we showed how three accounts of reasoning 
can explain why deduction is enhanced by feedback. Mental 
rules theories predict that feedback must affect individual 
rules to improve general performance on non-identical 
problems; however, substantial experience would be 
required for the reasoner to learn the individual relations 
between feedback and the use of particular rules across 
many contexts. The probability heuristics theory holds that 
individuals apply a series of simple heuristics based on 
approximations of statistical calculations. Regardless of the 
normative baseline used, feedback for a particular problem 
should cue participants to apply all relevant heuristics 
instead of a subset. Mental models theory posits that 
individuals flesh out models and search for counterexamples 
in order to obtain correct answers, and can make mistakes 
when they fail to do either. Thus, feedback may prompt the 
reasoner to search for counterexamples more assiduously, 
and could lead to general increases in performance across 
many types of problems. 
The results we report demonstrate that feedback and 
reinforcement can improve the efficacy of conscious 
reasoning. Theories of reasoning can be extended to handle 
feedback effects explicitly in the ways we outlined above, 
and doing so may allow future studies to identify and test 
the ways in which feedback information implicitly changes 
reasoners’ representations and inferential processes. 
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